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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONFLICT BETWEEN

-

BALANCING TEST EMPLOYED TO RESOLVE

STATE STATUTE

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION -

AND RESULTING BURDEN

ON

STATE INTEREST IN COMPELLING

COMPULSORY HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDANCE OUTWEIGHED BY RESULTING BURDEN ON FREE EXERCISE OF AMISH RELIGION.

Wisconsin v. Yoder (U.S. 1972)
Respondents,' members of the Old Order Amish Religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were convicted of violating a Wisconsin
statute requiring them to send their children under age sixteen to a public
or approved private school. 2 Although willing to allow attendance through

the eighth grade in small, local schools, 3 the respondents contended that
to compel them to send their adolescent children to a larger, consolidated
high school would force exposure to worldly values and lifestyles in
opposition to Amish religious tenets. As a result, respondents argued that
enforcement of the statute would jeopardize the salvation of themselves
and their children and endanger their religiously grounded, insulated,
communal life by forming a barrier to the cohesive integration of their
young.4 Accordingly, respondents claimed that the free exercise clause
of the first amendment required that an exception to the compulsory
1. Three prosecutions were joined for hearing in the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
State v. Yoder, No. 92 (Old Order Amish) ; State v. Yutzy, No. 93 (Old Order
Amish); State v. Miller, No. 94 (Conservative Amish Mennonite Church). State
v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
2. 5 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 40.77(1) (a) (1966) requires persons having a child
between the ages of seven and sixteen years under their control to send the child to
a public or approved substitute school during the regular sessions. The statute may
be enforced by fines of not less than five dollars nor more than fifty dollars, or by
imprisonment of not more than three months, or both. Id. at § 40.77(3).
3. Respondents' children Frieda Yoder, age 15, Barbara Miller, age 15, and
Vernon Yutzy, age 14, attended public school through the eighth grade. The Amish
have no objection to education through the first eight grades in such schools because
they believe in the necessity of a basic education and because there is a lack of
exposure to outside values in local schools of exclusively Amish makeup. 406 U.S. 205,
212 (1972).
4. Respondents introduced unchallenged expert testimony in the trial court to
the effect that their religious dictates forbid materialism and competitive values,
and require a way of life insulated from the social mainstream. 406 U.S. at 209-13.
See generally J. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY (1963) ; J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGTON, CHILDREN IN AMISH SOCIETY (1971); W. SCHREIBER, OUR AMISH NEIGHBORS

(1962); E. SMITH, THE AMISH PEOPLE (1958); Casad, Compulsory High School
Attendance and the Old Order Amish: A Commentary on State v. Garber, 16
U. KAN. L. REV. 423 (1968); Littell, Sectarian Protestantism and the Pursuit of
Wisdom: Must Technological Objectives Prevail?,in PUBLIC CONTROLS FOR NONPUBLIC
SCHOOLS (Erickson ed. 1969) ; Note, The Right Not to be Modern Men: The Amish
and Compulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REv. 925 (1967).

(955)
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education requirement be granted in their case.5 Wisconsin did not dispute
the nature of the Amish faith or the interference with free exercise of
religion caused by enforcement of the statute. 6 Rather, the state contended
that despite these considerations its interests in compulsory education
commanded a uniform enforcement of the statute. 7 The Supreme Court8
of Wisconsin applied the balancing test explicated in Sherbert v. Verner,
and reversed the trial court, granting an exemption from the statutory
requirements for Amish children past the eighth gradeY Utilizing the
same test, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed, holding that
the state's strong interest in compelling the secondary school attendance of
respondents' children was outweighed by the concomitant deleterious effect
which such compulsion worked on the free exercise of respondents' religious
beliefs. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
The Court has in the past been frequently confronted with situations
in which a state's interest in the enforcement of its laws conflicts with
the individual's interest in the free exercise of his religion. Treatment
of such disputes has progressed through three evolutionary stages.
In its initial period of doctrinal development, the Court, in the late
nineteenth century, faced the conflict between state law and the religiously
based polygamy of the Mormons - most notably in Reynolds v. United
States.'0 Fearful that a statutory exemption based on the free exercise
clause would "make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land,"" the Reynolds Court founded a longstanding distinction between religious belief and religious action. The effect of this
distinction was to shield the individual's religious beliefs from statutory
interference, while "[r]eligiously motivated action was to be subjected to
the police power of the state to the same extent as would similar action
springing from other motives."' 2 This first stage of the Court's doctrinal
evolution afforded the utmost in simplicity: religiously grounded belief
was characterized as superior to conflicting state regulations; religiously
grounded action had to conform to the requirements of state statutes.
8
The labelling of the interest itself provided the resolution of the problem.'
As the scope of state social regulation burgeoned during the 1940's,
the Court was spurred to its second stage. Reynolds prohibited behavioral
variation from statutory requirements, and, as the number of requirements
5. 406 U.S. at 209. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall
make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .

. . ."

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

6. 406 U.S. at 219.
7. Id.
8. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
10. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). For a similar case see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333 (1890).
11. 98 U.S. at 167.
12. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development.
Part I: The Religious Liberty Guaranteed, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1387 (1967).
13. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327,
328 (1969).
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increased, the number of prohibited variations mounted accordingly.14
Two effects were apparent. First, the policy of uniformly enforcing an
increasing number of state laws meant that governmental pursuit of relatively insignificant ends was often allowed to restrict religious behavior of
great significance to certain religious groups. Second, the restrictions often
prohibited conduct of religious origin when such prohibition did not serve
the purpose for which the regulation was designed, i.e., as restricting the
possession of alcohol curtailed the use of sacramental wine. 16
These considerations paved the way for the Court, in Cantwell v.
Connecticut,'6 to assert that the first amendment "embraces two concepts,
freedom to believe and freedom to act," 17 marking the first clear abandonment of the belief-action distinction.' Cantwell freed Jehovah's Witnesses
from a potentially arbitrary state licensing requirement, allowing them to
perform their religiously required solicitation without regard to the state
law.' Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, hinted at the
need to balance the state's interest in uniform enforcement against the
effects of an outright ban on conflicting religiously motivated action in
stating:
We must determine whether the alleged protection of the State's
interest ... has been pressed, in this instance, to a point where it has
come into fatal collision
with the overriding interest protected by the
20
federal compact.
The Court had thus shifted its characterization of the interests involved
to recognize that neither religious belief nor action could be subordinated
to state statutory requirements of only minimal importance. The Court was
willing to accommodate religious acts when the purpose of the statute, 21 or
the means by which the statute was enforced,22 was directed at no significant
state goal and when denial of an exemption would result in a severe burden
on the free exercise of religion. 23 However, where the legislation had a more
14. See Giannella, supra note 12, at 1388.
15. Id.
16. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

17. Id. at 303.

18. See Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point?,

1966 Wis. L.REv. 217, 236 (1966).
19. 310 U.S. at 309-11.
20. Id. at 307. See also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943),
where the Court, on a freedom of speech rationale, spoke of the need of "weighing
the conflicting interests." Id. at 143.
21. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). The Court concluded
that a licensing fee imposed on Jehovah's Witnesses' solicitation served no state
purpose since it was "fixed in amount and unrelated to the scope of activities of
petitioners or to their related revenues" and thus was not "a nominal fee imposed
as a regulatory measure to defray the expense of policing the activities in question."
Id. at 113.
22. Thus, in Cantwell, the Court found that the enforcement of the legislation
served no purpose since the conduct of defendants was not "noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive" and enforcement was thus not required. 310 U.S. at 308.
23. In Murdock, the Court found that the regulatory measure had a profound
suppressive effect on defendant's religious freedom. 319 U.S. at 114. In Cantwell,
the consequence of enforcement was deemed "a censorship of religion as the means
of determining its right to survive." 310 U.S. at 305.
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direct bearing on a reasonable state interest or where it exerted a more
indirect effect on the free exercise of religious acts, challengers to the
statute did not fare as well. 24 Thus, although recognizing a new breed
of competing interests, the Court had tipped the balance in favor of the
state before the weighing had begun.
The Court entered a third stage in Sherbert v. Verner.25 The applicability of a balancing procedure was reaffirmed, but in Sherbert the Court
transformed it into something very different from that which had been
previously applied. Sherbert dealt with a South Carolina statute which
predicated unemployment compensation on the availability for work when
offered.2 6 Appellant, a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, was
denied such benefits when she refused to accept Saturday work because
of her religious beliefs. 2 7

The state contended that the granting of an

exemption would impinge upon the state's regulatory scheme insofar as

it would increase the danger of fraudulent unemployment claims. 2 8 The

Court balanced the interests at stake and awarded the benefits sought
29
by appellant.
The balancing test which the Sherbert Court applied is significant for
two reasons. First, the Court was confronted with an indirect burden on
the free exercise of religious activity. Although no action was specifically
prohibited, the practice of specific acts was made more difficult. This
represented an expansion of the types of free exercise claims the Court
was now willing to protect against statutory infringement and was a
significant departure from the Court's earlier position which stressed the
need for a severe free exercise violation3 0 to outweigh even a less than
major state concern31 Second, Sherbert recast the types of state interest
needed to outweigh the newly cognizable free exercise burdens, and contra
Caldwell, shifted the burden to the state to prove the existence of endangered state interests of a much higher magnitude than that which had
24. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), where
was convicted of violating child labor statutes when there was no showing defendant
direct
harm to the child. See Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent, id. at 175. See alsoofHeisler
v. Board of Review, 156 Ohio St. 395, 102 N.E.2d 601, appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 939

(1952).

In Heisler, plaintiff was denied unemployment benefits when he failed to
accept Saturday work on religious grounds. The Supreme Court found
"substantial federal question." 343 U.S. at 940. Apparently, an exemption no
was not
warranted because the financial burden placed on the free exercise of religion
was
not as direct or onerous as in Murdock or Cantwell.
25. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
26. 14 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 68-1 to 68-404 (1962).
27. 374 U.S. at 399.
28. Id. at 407.
29. Id.
30. See Heisler v. Board of Review, 156 Ohio St. 395, 102 N.E.2d 601, appeal
dismissed, 343 U.S. 939 (1952). The Sherbert Court would find a requisite
free
exercise burden in the denial of even a "gratuitous benefit." 374 U.S. at 405.
31. One commentator has argued that in requiring a showing of significant harm
to the state's interest, Sherbert has effectively overruled Prince. See Giannella, supra
note 12, at 1389.
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been previously required. 2 The Court analogized the state's burden in
such free exercise disputes to past free speech decisions in which language
such as "the gravest abuses" and "paramount interests" described that which
3
the state had to document to override any first amendment violation. 3
The Court had thus recharacterized its view of the interests involved and
the way in which it would strike a balance between them.
Operating in this historical context, Yoder would appear to assume
increased significance in the evolution of the Supreme Court's first amendment doctrine as the first instance since Sherbert in which the Court has
34
explicitly applied its restructured balancing test to the free exercise area.
The Court was thus faced with the important problem of clarifying what
state interests would overcome the burden which Sherbert imposed.3 5
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,36 began his
analysis of the issues by documenting the claims of the respondents and
concluding that they did in fact merit free exercise protection.8 7 The
Court stressed that a way of life based solely on secular grounds and
personal philisophical preference "does not rise to the demands of the
Religion Clauses. 38s The Court thus turned to the record in order to
establish that the Amish lifestyle "is not merely a matter of personal
32. See Clark, supra note 13, at 329. See also Galanter, supra note 18, at 244;
Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relationt, 67 Micn.
L. REv. 269, 276 (1968).
33. 374 U.S. at 406, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
34. On facts substantially similar to those in Yoder, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 51 (1967), "thus passing up the opportunity to deal with the important issues
of religious liberty raised therein." Kauper, supra note 32, at 276.
35. In characterizing that burden the Court stated that "only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims
to the free exercise of religion." 406 U.S. at 215.
36. Mr. Justice Brennan joined Mr. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion.
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart joined Mr. Justice White in his
concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in part. Mr. Justice Powell and
Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
37. 406 U.S. at 214.
38. 406 U.S. at 216. The Court also stated:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a
barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely
secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the
claims must be rooted in religious belief.
Id. at 215. In so holding, the Court defined "religion" for the purposes of free
exercise protection as excluding beliefs rooted in philosophical, as opposed to religious
bases. The Court analogized Thoreau's rejection of "the social values of his time" when
he removed himself to Walden Pond, and stated that "Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious," thus showing that even the strongest
of personal commitments could not qualify for religious protection if based solely on
individual value preferences. Id. at 216.
These statements can be read as a step back from the more liberal interpretation of "religion" in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Mr. Justice
Black, defining the term for the purposes of § 6(j) of the Uniform Military Training
and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1970) stated that:
[W]e certainly do not think that § 6(j)'s exclusion of those persons with
"essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code" should be read to exclude those who hold strong beliefs about
our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection
to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon consideration
of pubic policy.
398 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added).
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preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized
group, and intimately related to daily living."'3 The Court was impressed
by the fact that the Amish base their entire existence on a religiously
mandated rejection of worldly influences and outside contact 40 and noted
that they have demonstrated their conviction by maintaining a virtually
unchanged agrarian community structure for centuries. 41 The Court then
was able to gauge the extent of any free exercise burden by comparing the
conduct which the statute required to that which the Amish belief required.
Respondents' expert testimony led the Court to conclude that compulsory
attendance in modern secondary schools would force exposure to outside
values while producing psychological conflicts and barriers to the Amish
child's cohesive integration into the religiously required community existence. 42 Based on these factors, the Court determined that enforcement of
the statute "would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of
'43
respondents' religious beliefs."
Having established the existence of a genuine free exercise violation
of significant proportions, the Court then turned to the analysis of the
state's contention that notwithstanding the religious beliefs of the Amish,
its interest in compelling secondary education was sufficiently significant to
require enforcement of the statute. 44 The state's arguments may be grouped
into thr. categories for purposes of analysis.
The state first contended that compulsory secondary education is
required "to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in
our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. ' 45
In short, an informed electorate is vital to a democratic society. 46 The
Court disposed of this contention by noting that preparation for the mainstream of society is not the only legitimate function of education, 47 nor
the only means of fulfilling political and social responsibilities. 48 The Court
felt that the long history of the Amish as a successful, self-sufficient unit
demonstrated their ability to function in a democratic process which
49
purports to respect the diversity which imposes no social burdens.
The state's second argument proceeded on the supposition that should
the Amishman choose to leave the confines of the insulated community, he
39. 406 U.S. at 206.
40. Id. at 216-17.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 212, 218.
43. Id. at 219.
44. The Court quickly disposed of two preliminary arguments offered by the

state. The state first stressed the belief-action distinction to support the need
to enforce the statute, but the Court's historical analysis refuted their contention.
The state secondly based an argument on the nondiscriminatory nature of their

statute, but the Court noted that this in itself did not remove the threat of a
free exercise burden. Id. at 219-21.

45. Id. at 221.
46. See Brief for Petitioner at 10-14, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

47. 406 U.S. at 222, 223-24.
48. Id. at 225-26.
49. Id. at 222, 225-26.
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would be without the intellectual prerequisites for survival. 50 The Court
found this proposition to be an unfounded one. Not only did the state
fail to document that the loss of adherents by attrition was presently
demonstrating such a lack of preparation,5 ' but the state also failed to
recognize that the Amish society does in fact inculcate skills which would
52
find ready markets in the modern world.
The state argued finally that an exception to the statute "fails to
recognize the substantive right of the Amish child to a secondary education,
and fails to give due regard to the power of the state as parens patriae to
extend the benefit of secondary education to children regardless of the
wishes of their parents. '53 The state contended that the denial of such
education removed from the Amish child the capability to choose an alternative way of life, since the failure to expose Amish children to alternatives
was an effective denial of the capability to make an intelligent choice. 54 The
Court did not deny that such might be the case, 55 but relied on Pierce v.
Society of Sister 5 6 in finding a "charter of the rights of parents to direct
the religious upbringing of their children." 57 The Court indicated that
enforcement of the statute in this instance would interfere with parental
rights by significantly influencing the "religious future of the child"5' 8 and
found no counterbalancing interest grounded either in the need to protect
the health or safety of the child or in the concerns of society. 59
Stressing the burden which enforcement of the statute would hold
for the Amish and the successful child preparation evidenced by the
self-sufficient nature of the Amish sect, the Court concluded that "it was
incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly
strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by
granting an exemption to the Amish." 60
The Yoder Court may have been justified in finding that the free
exercise burdens in issue were more worthy of protection than the interests which Wisconsin asserted. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the
analysis of this ultimate conclusion is not nearly as important for the
resolution of future conflicts of this nature as is the analysis of the process
by which the Court reached its eventual result. It is further submitted that
50. Id. at 224. See Brief for Petitioner at 17.
51. 406 U.S. at 224.
52. Id. at 224-25.
The testimony of Dr. Donald A. Erickson, an expert witness on education, also
showed that the Amish succeed in preparing their high school age children
to be productive members of the Amish community. He described their system
of learning-through-doing the skills directly relevant to their adult roles in the
Amish community as "ideal" and perhaps superior to ordinary high school
education.
Id. at 212.
53. Id. at 229.
54. Id. at 232.
55. See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
56. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
57. 406 U.S. at 233.
58. Id. at 232.
59. Id. at 234.
60. Id. at 236, citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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the opinion, when scrutinized with this in mind, provides only minimal
guidance with respect to the future adjustment between free exercise
interests and the pursuit of legitimate state ends.
The balancing test applied in Yoder must be distinguished from a
test which weighs the degree to which different courses of conduct serve
a particular policy end. In the latter, the factors being weighed are
measured against a common denominator - the extent to which they
promote the same policy. However, as the Court operated the balance in
Yoder, what was being measured was not the extent to which two different
courses of conduct promoted a discernible policy, but rather the extent
to which two different courses of conduct promoted two or more different
policies. At that point, it was the relative desirability of the respective
policies which were balanced. In short, the common denominator between
the factors being weighed was not present in Yoder. The Court could not
61
seize on a standard by which to measure the worth of that being compared.
Since the conflicting interests had to be resolved only as they balanced
against one another, the Court's conclusion itself merely expressed that
the prevention of a significant free exercise burden is more important than
that which the state would gain by requiring secondary school attendance
of Amish children. The ability of this decision to shed light on whether
or not free exercise protection is more important than other state policies
would depend on the degree to which those policies conform to the social
importance of the state's goals as determined by the Yoder Court. It
follows that the predictability which Yoder lends to the determination of
such future conflicts hinges on the ability of future courts to analogize the
state interests they have to deal with to the valuations arrived at in Yoder.
This ability turns on the clarity, completeness, and objectivity with which
the Yoder Court assessed the state policies in question. The contention
here is that the failure of the Court to engage in such an analysis leaves
future courts faced with similar 2 situations obliged to engage in a largely
6
ad hoc decision-making process.
In the state's first argument, the Court was confronted with the need
to determine whether the protection of free exercise interests counterbalanced the assurance of an electorate familiar with the issues which
confront a modern democracy. 3 The Court responded, however, by
asserting that the state's political interest in education was served not61. As one writer states: "[T]here is neither a set of principles which allocate
rules of decision to particular types of fact situations nor objective criteria for
assigning weights to religious and governmental interests in various contexts."
Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L.

REV.

679, 687 (1967).
62. One commentator specifies the consequences of such a methodology to
include the removal of an advance notion of rights and powers from individuals
and prosecutors, the lack of guidance to lower courts, and the diminution of the
legitimacy usually accorded a Supreme Court decision. See Clark, supra note 13,
at 330. As a result, there exists the danger of merely "affirming prevailing morality
over the religious liberty of radical dissenters." Giannella, supra note 12, at 1385.
63. See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
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withstanding the separatist existence of the Amish. 64 In this manner, the
Court avoided the full consideration of that which the state contended
would result from a failure to enforce the statute. It is submitted that
the Court's dismissal of the state's position in this fashion was not predicated
upon a sufficient basis.
In documenting its position, the Court turned to Meyer v. Nebraska5
in stating that:
It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two
beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the
preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority live,
but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as the
preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian community
that is the keystone of the Amish faith. 66
In addition, the Court stressed that when Thomas Jefferson emphasized
the state's need to educate the people, he had in mind merely a "sturdy
yeoman" schooled in educational basics similar to those which the Amish

already successfully impart.6 7
Initially, it must be noted that the Meyer Court did not endorse the
promotion of separated communities. Rather, Meyer held that allowing
children to receive foreign language education did not impede amalgamation
into the larger society as the state claimed. 68 The Meyer Court thus implied
the existence of a bona fide state concern in fostering the integration of
the child into the social mainstream, 69 and the case thus provides no
justification for the endorsement of Amish separatism.
Additionally, it must be remembered that when Jefferson idealized
the "sturdy yeoman" as the existence which would sufficiently meet the
needs of the state, he wrote of a state which was primarily agrarian, and
advocated such a pattern for the masses rather than for an insulated
group.7" The Court's Jeffersonian analysis would seem to falter when
applied to a small group within the highly developed society which
exists today.
Thus the Yoder Court's failure to insert into the balance that which
the state asserted would not appear to be amply justified. Further, it
seems arguable that the real basis for the Court's position here is simply
that the state's interest in maintaining an informed electorate is not sig64. See notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text supra.
65. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
66. 406 U.S. at 222.
67. Id. at 225-26.
68. 262 U.S. at 402-03.
69. Id. at 402.
70. The Court itself seemed to recognize this when it stated: "And it is clear
that so far as the mass of the people were concerned he envisaged that
a basic
education in the 'three R's' would sufficiently meet the interests of the State."
406 U.S. at 226 n.14 (emphasis added). See also Mr. Justice Marshall's dissenting
opinion in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973) wherein he

states that "[education serves the essential function of instilling in our young an
understanding of and appreciation for the principles and operation of our governmental process . . . . Indeed, it has frequently been suggested that education is the
dominant factor affecting political consciousness and participation." Id. at 1338.
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nificantly compromised when only a small group of citizens are the subject
of dispute. If that is the case, not only is there no hint at how large the
group must be before the state interest assumes noticeable proportions,
but the Court is then determining the ability to assert constitutional rights
71
by reference to the number of people claiming the rights.
In its second argument, the state noted a policy interest in providing
the Amish with the capability of functioning in modern society should they
choose to leave the Amish sect. 72 The Court characterized the state as
contending that if the Amish leave their community, they will become
"burdens on society,"73 since the state mistakenly assumed that the Amish
allow their young to "grow in ignorance. '74 It should be noted, however,
that the state did not challenge the respondents' expert testimony concerning
the nature of Amish existence, 75 and thus at no time denied that the Amish
competently prepared their young in the skills required for an agrarian
life. This becomes more clear upon recognizing that the policy which the
state was advocating sought not only to provide a basis for Amish who
left the community to make a living, but also to provide the intellectual
means to pursue a non-agrarian career should that be the Amishman's
choice. That this was in fact part of the state's contention is demonstrated
by that portion of the dissenting opinion in the Wisconsin Supreme Court
which the state quoted in its brief:
The traditional Amish life has its attractions, but ought this court,
by depriving Amish children of all but a bare eighth grade education,
76
block for all time all other avenues for them.
Thus, the significance of the state's interest in pursuing that policy

providing the Amishman a means to exist through non-Amish ways of
his choice - and its relation to the significance of free exercise protection
was not properly treated by the Court.
Finally, in its third argument, the state asserted that the need to
provide Amish children with the capability to choose alternative lifestyles
outweighs the protection of the free exercise of their parents' religion. 77
The Court was directly confronted with the difficult question of determining
the point at which the state has a right to interfere with the religious
choices traditionally made by parents for their children. In essence, the
state was asking whether the nearly total lack of exposure to the outside
world, allegedly resulting in a denial of the capability to opt for a lifestyle
71. "It would be unseemly if an exception lost its constitutional status when

the religious group or groups that utilized it became too numerous." Galanter, supra
note 18, at 296. See also Clark, supra note 13, at 332-33; Kurland, Expanding
Concepts of Religious Freedom, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 215 (1966).
72. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.

73. 406 U.S. at 224.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 219.
76. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, quoting State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 452,
182 N.W.2d 539, 549 (1971).
77. See notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
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apart from traditional modes of Amish life, would be sufficient justification
for state interference. The Court attacked the problem in three ways.
First, the Court responded by asserting that:
The same argument could, of course, be made with respect to all
church schools short of college. There is nothing in the record or in
the ordinary course of human experience to suggest that non-Amish
parents generally consult with children up to ages 14-16 if they are
placed in a church school of the parents' faith. 78
This response would appear to avoid the problem. Not only does this
observation fail to deny the existence of the harm to the child as the state
conceived it, but it also fails to recognize that the state's argument centers
on the cultural isolation inherent in the Amish community. In comparing
that community to a church school, the Court fails to note that attendance
in such schools is neither characterized by total isolation apart from the
school nor lack of those secular subjects omitted in Amish training. The
differences which exist between the situations cannot justify the failure to
fully consider the effects of a lack of secondary education.
Second, the Court noted by way of Pierce that traditionally, parental
responsibility in determining the religion of the child is accorded a highly
respected position. 79 However, Pierce only allowed parents to place their
children in a religious school which also met the state's curiculum requirements.80 Using Pierce to allow a total isolation not only from the
usual coursework but also from contact with the outside world is a tenuous
extrapolation. 8 ' The Court attempted to justify that result with reference
to Prince v. Massachusetts82 in support of the proposition that parental
responsibility may be subject to state regulation only "if it appears that
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or
have a potential for significant social burdens."8 3 Although the Court did
not specify those factors which would bear on health or safety, mental health
considerations were placed within the ambit of the factors considered.8 4
If by reference to Prince the Court meant to connote that denial of
the capability to choose a lifestyle is not to be considered, it would appear
that the foundation for the Court's contention is somewhat wanting. Prince
found an impingement on the child's health and safety which was sufficient
to override a free exercise violation merely in the distribution of religious
78. 406 U.S. at 232.
79. See notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
80. 268 U.S. at 531-35.
81. One commentator made the following query:
Are "closed" subgroups to be permitted to perpetuate their self-contained isolation
by the inculcation and isolation of their young?

Or must they compete for

the ideological loyalty of their young in the wider social arena? . . .At what
point are the enrichments of diversity outweighed by the virtues of enlightenment?
Galanter, supra note 18, at 287-88.
82. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
83. 406 U.S. at 324.
84. Id.
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literature by the child after nightfall in the presence of an adult.85 This
would seem to be a less significant detriment to the child's welfare than
that asserted within the state's argument, but the Yoder Court concluded
that "[t]his case, of course, is not one in which any harm to the physical
or mental health of the child . . . has been demonstrated or may be
properly inferred." 86

Finally, the Court treated the state's third argument by asserting that
an additional one or two years of secondary education would not result in
significant beneficial consequences for the child.8 7 It is difficult to align
this proposition with the Court's earlier determination that the additional
one or two years of education could result in the formation of a barrier to
the child's integration into the Amish community.88 The Court seemed
to be saying that the values and lifestyles to which the adolescent child is
exposed will be of great significance in the determination of his own
lifestyle. 9 It follows from this reasoning that if this period is so crucial,
and that if during this period the child is exposed only to the Amish way
of life, his capability to choose another lifestyle at a later stage in his
development would be seriously limited. One is significantly curtailed from
choosing that to which one has not been exposed. It would also follow
that compulsory education, in providing such outside exposure, provides
at least some of the prerequisites of the capability to not be Amish.
Although the Court did stress additional negative consequences of the
two years - referring to the possibilties of engendering psychological
conflicts ° - it is submitted that the Court did not at the same time fairly
accord secondary education the positive significance which it deserved. 9 1
85. See Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent in Prince, 321 U.S. at 175.
86. The Court apparently recognized this dilemma in stating that Sherbert
"took great care to confine Prince to a narrow scope." 406 U.S. at 230. In actuality,
Sherbert merely cited Prince for the proposition that the state must prove "some
substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order." 374 U.S. at 403. It is thus not
clear whether Sherbert was in fact limiting Prince or whether Sherbert was endorsing
the harm found to exist in Prince as sufficient to counterbalance a free exercise
violation.
As examples of what would constitute sufficient harm the Court cited Jacobsen
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) ; Application of President and Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1010 (D.C. Cir.) (chambers opinion),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906,
385 S.W.2d 644 (1965). Both Jacobsen and Wright concern the state's interest in
compulsory smallpox vaccination, while Georgetown concerns the rights of the state
to compel necessary medical treatment of a child against his parents' wishes. It is
submitted that these cases, bearing only upon the most obvious state priorities of life
and death, provide no guide to the adequacy of an interest such as that asserted
in Yoder.
87. 406 U.S. at 234.
88. Id. at 218. See notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text supra.
89. The Court referred to the "crucial and formative adolescent period of life"
during which the groundwork for integration into the Amish community must be
laid. Id. at 211.
90. Id. at 212.
91. It has been stated that "the pivotal position of education to success in
American society and its essential role in opening up to the individual the central
experiences of our culture lend it an importance that is undeniable." Developments
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The Yoder Court was faced with the need to determine whether the
state interests alleged were strong enough to outweigh a demonstrably
severe free exercise burden. While the Court's analysis seems to have
provided a workable criterion for the assessment of the religious interest
in question,9 2 it would not appear to aid future courts faced with the
need to determine whether the pursuit of other state interests should or
should not outweigh such a strong free exercise violation. At times, the
Court appeared to avoid the need to engage in any balancing of the precise
factors placed before it. When it did balance the policies, the Court seemed
to recharacterize the issues so as to be able to weigh that which was more
easily resolvable than the problems actually presented. In so doing, the
Court did not engage in the full and objective evaluation of closely competing interests to which future courts could turn for guidance by analogy
in the determination of the weights of other state policies.9

Although such a tack limits the usefulness of precedent in affording
predictability to the resolution of similar conflicts, it should not be assumed
that such an approach to the free exercise-state interest area is automatically
counterproductive. In so restricting the use of the opinion, the Court may
be taken as implying that each case must be decided on its particular facts,
without reference to previous determinations. Since in this type of balancing the conflicts between the interests involved are measured only as
they weigh against one another, it would seem to be dangerous to endorse
analogy to the valuation of a state interest in a previous case, when that
valuation was determined by reference to a free exercise burden of a
magnitude which may not be present in the subsquent situation. The
usefulness of comparison is inhibited by this lack of an outside criteria
against which the factors are measured.
in the Law - Equal Protection, 32 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1129 (1969). It is interesting
to note in this regard that the Court has most recently determined that education
is not a fundamental right under the constitution for equal protection review of
state legislation purposes. The Court did, however, stress its "undisputed importance"
notwithstanding that holding. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct.
1278, 1297 (1973).
93. On the need to objectively characterize the interests in question, it has
been noted:
It would indeed be begging the question to purport to balance some highly
generalized and obviously crucial interest, such as the right of the legislature to
inform itself of matters bearing on national security, against some rather
particular and narrowly conceived claim such as the right of a particular
individual to withhold a particular, perhaps trivial, item of information from a
committee on this occasion. Any such formulation, of course, seems to require
only one answer, but it does so at the expense of ignoring the fact that the
claim of the witness may be stated in equally generalized form, and therefore
may perhaps take on equally impressive proportions. The Court should never
cast the controversy in a form which conceals the conflict to be resolved, as it
does whenever it inflates one part of the balance while leaving the other highly
particular.
Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's
Balancing Test, 76 HARv. L. REv. 755, 763 (1963).
For views on how the balancing test does or should operate in a free
exercise-state interest context, see generally Clark, supra note 13; Galanter, supra
note 18; Giannella, supra note 12.
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